Generally
"[A] statute draws its meaning from its text. And because
we presume that the General Assembly meant what it
said and said what it meant when it comes to the meaning
of statutes, we must read the statutory text in its most
natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the
English language would. Important are the common and
customary usages of the words, which, in cases like this
one, include the usual and customary meaning of terms
as used in a legal context. For context, we may look to
other provisions of the same statute, the structure and
history of the whole statute, and the other law— constitutional, statutory, and common law alike—that
forms the legal background of the statutory provision in
question." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Loudermilk, 305 Ga. 558, 562 (1) (826 SE2d 116) (2019).
The Meaning of Words
In interpreting statutes, “we look first to the text . . . [a]nd because we presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant when it comes to the meaning of statutes,” we “must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” See also FDIC v. Loudermilk, 305 Ga. 558, 562 (826 SE2d 116) (2019) (citations, quotations, and punctuation omitted); Heron Lake Apartments v. Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessors, s19a0975(2019).
Deriving Meaning From Context
"The phrase 'private property' is not defined in OCGA § 16-11-
127 (c), and the Code does not otherwise provide an applicable
definition for that phrase. Thus, we must examine the meaning of those words in their broader context, including other legal
authorities which may inform our understanding of the phrase’s
meaning in this statute." See Georgiacarry.org, Inc. et al. v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc., S18g1149 (Ga. 2019) (referencing Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)).
Showing posts with label Modules. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Modules. Show all posts
Monday, October 14, 2019
Saturday, October 5, 2019
Declaratory Judgement Act Module
Generally
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, OCGA § 9-4-1 et seq., “[i]n cases of actual controversy,” and “in any civil case in which . . . the ends of justice [so] require.”
“The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations; the Act is to be liberally construed and administered.” Id. (citation 11 and punctuation omitted).
Subject matter jurisdiction
Georgia’s superior courts “have power . . . to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party petitioning for” such a declaration. OCGA § 9-4-2 (a), (b).
“To state a claim for declaratory judgment," as against a claim that the court lacks jurisdiction for lack of a ripe controversy, "a party need only allege the existence of a justiciable controversy in which future conduct depends on resolution of uncertain legal relations.” City of Atlanta v. Hotels.com, L.P., 285 Ga. 231, 235-236 (674 SE2d 898) (2009) (holding that City stated viable claim for declaratory relief as to applicability of hotel tax ordinance).
Examples
"As the Board's petition demonstrates, the parties in this case have an actual, justiciable controversy: namely, whether and how the Board can, under the 2017 amendment, consider the LIHTCS awarded to Appellants when carrying out its mandatory duty to assess ad valorem property taxes . . . . The legal question . . . has created substantial uncertainty with respect to the parties
legal rights and legal relations." Heron Lake Apartments v. Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessors, S19a0975 (2019)
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, OCGA § 9-4-1 et seq., “[i]n cases of actual controversy,” and “in any civil case in which . . . the ends of justice [so] require.”
“The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations; the Act is to be liberally construed and administered.” Id. (citation 11 and punctuation omitted).
Subject matter jurisdiction
Georgia’s superior courts “have power . . . to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party petitioning for” such a declaration. OCGA § 9-4-2 (a), (b).
“To state a claim for declaratory judgment," as against a claim that the court lacks jurisdiction for lack of a ripe controversy, "a party need only allege the existence of a justiciable controversy in which future conduct depends on resolution of uncertain legal relations.” City of Atlanta v. Hotels.com, L.P., 285 Ga. 231, 235-236 (674 SE2d 898) (2009) (holding that City stated viable claim for declaratory relief as to applicability of hotel tax ordinance).
Examples
"As the Board's petition demonstrates, the parties in this case have an actual, justiciable controversy: namely, whether and how the Board can, under the 2017 amendment, consider the LIHTCS awarded to Appellants when carrying out its mandatory duty to assess ad valorem property taxes . . . . The legal question . . . has created substantial uncertainty with respect to the parties
legal rights and legal relations." Heron Lake Apartments v. Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessors, S19a0975 (2019)
Tuesday, May 14, 2019
Georgia Constitutional Interpretation Module
Presumption of Constitutionality
It is well-settled that all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature and that before an Act of the legislature can be declared unconstitutional, the conflict between it and the fundamental law must be clear and palpable and this Court must be clearly satisfied of its unconstitutionality. Moreover, because statutes are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary appears, the burden is on the party alleging a statute to be unconstitutional to prove it. Dev. Auth. of DeKalb Co. v. State of Ga., 286 Ga. 36, 38 (1) (684 SE2d 856) (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted).
The challenger has a "heavy burden of demonstrating that a 'clear and palpable' conflict exists between the 2017 amendment and the taxation uniformity provision." Heron Lake Apartments v. Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessors, s19a0975 (2019).
Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine
If “the language of an act is susceptible of a 21 construction that is constitutional, and another that would be unconstitutional, that meaning or construction will be applied which will sustain the act.” HCA Health Svcs. v. Roach, 265 Ga. 501, 503 (458 SE2d 118) (1995) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Original public meaning
"We interpret the Georgia Constitution according to its original public meaning." Elliot (***) The reason for this, the Court has explained, is that “the Constitution, like every other instrument made by men, is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the makers of it at the time when they made it. To deny this is to insist that a fraud shall be perpetrated upon those makers or upon some of them.” See Padelford, Fay & Co. v. Mayor and Alderman of City of Savannah, 14 Ga. 438, 454 (1854). To determine a provision's original public meaning, we must consider the language, history, and context of that provision. Id at ***. Unlike other forms of interpretation, the focal point of "original public meaning" is not the intent of the drafters "[s]ince the people are the ultimate 'makers' of the Georgia Constitution" in the sense that they elect the drafters of the document, and must ratify the proposed Constitution. (emphasis added) See Elliot, 2019 WL 654178 at *3 n.4 (citing Olevik, 302 Ga. at 237-239).
It is well-settled that all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature and that before an Act of the legislature can be declared unconstitutional, the conflict between it and the fundamental law must be clear and palpable and this Court must be clearly satisfied of its unconstitutionality. Moreover, because statutes are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary appears, the burden is on the party alleging a statute to be unconstitutional to prove it. Dev. Auth. of DeKalb Co. v. State of Ga., 286 Ga. 36, 38 (1) (684 SE2d 856) (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted).
The challenger has a "heavy burden of demonstrating that a 'clear and palpable' conflict exists between the 2017 amendment and the taxation uniformity provision." Heron Lake Apartments v. Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessors, s19a0975 (2019).
Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine
If “the language of an act is susceptible of a 21 construction that is constitutional, and another that would be unconstitutional, that meaning or construction will be applied which will sustain the act.” HCA Health Svcs. v. Roach, 265 Ga. 501, 503 (458 SE2d 118) (1995) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Original public meaning
"We interpret the Georgia Constitution according to its original public meaning." Elliot (***) The reason for this, the Court has explained, is that “the Constitution, like every other instrument made by men, is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the makers of it at the time when they made it. To deny this is to insist that a fraud shall be perpetrated upon those makers or upon some of them.” See Padelford, Fay & Co. v. Mayor and Alderman of City of Savannah, 14 Ga. 438, 454 (1854). To determine a provision's original public meaning, we must consider the language, history, and context of that provision. Id at ***. Unlike other forms of interpretation, the focal point of "original public meaning" is not the intent of the drafters "[s]ince the people are the ultimate 'makers' of the Georgia Constitution" in the sense that they elect the drafters of the document, and must ratify the proposed Constitution. (emphasis added) See Elliot, 2019 WL 654178 at *3 n.4 (citing Olevik, 302 Ga. at 237-239).
Presumption of Constitutional Continuity
The principle of constitutional continuity embraces two presumptions: first, that a re-adopted constitutional provision carries forward the original public meaning from the time which it initially adopted, as opposed to a possible public meaning at the time of re-adoption; and second, that a re-adopted constitutional provision which has received consistent construction carries with it the construction it received under prior versions of the Constitution.
Today, of course, "the Georgia Constitution that we interpret . . . is the Constitution of 1983; the original public meaning of that Constitution is the public meaning it had at the time of its ratification in 1982." Elliot, 2019 WL 654178 at *2.
"Many of the provisions of the Constitution of 1983 first originated in an earlier Georgia constitution . . . [t]he meanings of those previous provisions is critical to understanding the meaning they carried at the time they were readopted." Id.
“A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Constitutions, like statutes, are properly to be expounded in the light of conditions existing at the time of their adoption.” Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163, 166 (33 SE2d 425) (1945). The Court therefore presumes "that a constitutional provision retained from a previous constitution without material change has retained the original public meaning that provision had at the time it first entered a Georgia Constitution, absent some indication to the contrary." (emphasis added) See Elliot, 2019 WL 654178 at *3 (citing cases). Similarly, "[a] constitutional clause that is readopted into a new constitution and that has received a consistent and definitive construction is presumed to carry the same meaning as that consistent construction." Id. at *3-4; See also McKnight v. City of Decatur, 200 Ga. 611, 616 (1946).
Today, of course, "the Georgia Constitution that we interpret . . . is the Constitution of 1983; the original public meaning of that Constitution is the public meaning it had at the time of its ratification in 1982." Elliot, 2019 WL 654178 at *2.
"Many of the provisions of the Constitution of 1983 first originated in an earlier Georgia constitution . . . [t]he meanings of those previous provisions is critical to understanding the meaning they carried at the time they were readopted." Id.
“A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Constitutions, like statutes, are properly to be expounded in the light of conditions existing at the time of their adoption.” Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163, 166 (33 SE2d 425) (1945). The Court therefore presumes "that a constitutional provision retained from a previous constitution without material change has retained the original public meaning that provision had at the time it first entered a Georgia Constitution, absent some indication to the contrary." (emphasis added) See Elliot, 2019 WL 654178 at *3 (citing cases). Similarly, "[a] constitutional clause that is readopted into a new constitution and that has received a consistent and definitive construction is presumed to carry the same meaning as that consistent construction." Id. at *3-4; See also McKnight v. City of Decatur, 200 Ga. 611, 616 (1946).
A federal constitutional provision is only persuasive where it shares text or history with Georgia
The third principle of Georgia Constitutional interpretation is, succinctly, that the Federal Constitution and our State Constitution are two different documents. As such, "Georgia constitutional provisions may confer greater, fewer, or the same rights as similar provisions of the United States Constitution, and decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting those similar provisions are persuasive in our interpretation of the Georgia Constitution only to the extent that those decisions are rooted in shared history, language, and context." (emphasis added) Elliot, 2019 WL 654178 at *5 . While the court must "faithfully apply the decisions of the United States Supreme Court as to the meaning of that [federal] provision," the Court "owe[s] those federal decisions no obedience when interpreting our own Constitution." Id.
The Court emphasized in Elliot that state constitutional rights were “meant to be and remain genuine guarantees against misuse of the state’s governmental powers, truly independent of the rising and falling tides of federal case law both in method and in specifics.” Id. at 6 (citing State v. Kennedy, 666 P2d 1316, 1323 (Or. 1983)). Thus, “[s]tate constitutional provisions may . . . confer greater protections than their federal counterparts, provided that such broader scope is rooted in the language, history, and context of the state provision. In the same way, a state constitution may also offer less rights than federal law, so long as it does not affirmatively violate federal law.” Id.
Wednesday, May 1, 2019
Stare Decisis Module
Generally
"Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts generally stand by their prior decisions, because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. Stare decisis, however, is not an inexorable command. Courts, like individuals, but with more caution and deliberation, must sometimes reconsider what has been already carefully considered, and rectify their own mistakes. In reconsidering our prior decisions, we must balance the importance of having the question decided against the importance of having it decided right. To that end, we have developed a test that [1] considers the age of precedent, [2] the reliance interests at stake, [3] the workability of the decision, and, most importantly, [4] the soundness of its reasoning. The soundness of a precedent’s reasoning is the most important factor." (citations and punctuation omitted) Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 244-245 (2017); see also Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
"Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law, particularly in the context of statutory interpretation where our incorrect decisions are more easily corrected by the democratic process. However, stare decisis is not an 'inexorable command' nor 'a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.' Stare decisis is instead a 'principle of policy.' In considering whether to reexamine a prior erroneous holding, we must balance the importance of having the question decided against the importance of having it decided right. In doing so, we consider factors such as [1] the age of the precedent, [2] the reliance interests at stake, [3] the workability of the decision, and, most importantly, [4] the soundness of its reasoning." (citations and punctuation omitted) State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658-659 (2010).
"Courts, like individuals, but with more caution and deliberation, must sometimes reconsider what has been already carefully considered, and rectify their own mistakes." Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
Constitutional Cases
"We have also said that stare decisis carries less weight when our prior precedent involved the interpretation of the Constitution, which is more difficult than statutory interpretation for the legislative process to correct. This doesn't mean that we disregard stare decisis altogether, though; what it actually means is that the first stare decisis factor (soundness of reasoning) becomes even more critical. The more wrong a prior precedent got the Constitution, the less room there is for the other factors to preserve it." Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2017) (citing Ga Dept. of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. 593, 601 (2014)).
1- The age of the precedent
2- The reliance interests at stake
"Substantial reliance interests are an important consideration for precedents involving contract and property rights, where parties may have acted in conformance with existing legal rules in order to conduct transactions.' " Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2017) (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) and Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 641 (2015)).
"To be sure, the State has some sort of interest in preserving [a case] so that pending [criminal cases] are not disturbed." Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2017).
In the constitutional context, in order to prevail over correctness as a value reliance interests must "outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional rights fully protected. If it is clear that a practice is unlawful, individuals' interest in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement entitlement to its persistence. 'The mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of [constitutional rights]." Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2017) (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349-350 (2009)).
"Price [a decision holding that police officers must inform DUI suspects they have the right to refuse to take breath tests] also created no reliance interests of the sort normally considered in stare decisis analysis." State v. Turnquest, S19A0157 at *39 (2019).
"The issue addressed by Waldrip 'is one of appellate procedure, not contract, property, or other substantive rights in which anyone has a significant reliance interest . . . the authority this Court claimed for itself in Waldrip has very rarely been cited in the years since Waldrip was decided' " Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
3- The workability of the decision
"Waldrip is unworkable for both appellate and trial courts. First, the reach of its rationale is limitless . . . . nothing in our law establishes the outer boundaries of appellate courts' discretion to exercise this power or gives litigants or trial courts any meaningful indication of how and under what circumstances appellate courts will exercise the power . . . Moreover, the discretion this Court claimed for appellate courts in Waldrip would seem to apply equally with regard to any statutory requirement for appeal . . . Waldrip presents significant workability problems for trial courts, as well . . . a trial courts has no means of prediting when a case may be snatched from its docket." Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
4- The soundness of the precedent's reasoning
"Although Price appears to be a decision of Georgia statutory law, Georgia Constitutional law, or both, it contains no discussion of any particular Georgia statute or constitutional provision. Neither our opinion in Price nor any of the authorities on which it relies contain any analysis of whether the language, history, and context of the Georgia Constitution required Miranda warnings as a matter of Georgia constitutional law; when such analysis is actually done, it is plain that the Georgia Constitution requires no such thing . . . to the extent that Price was based on the former OCGA 24-9-20, its holding has no basis in history or the text of that provision." State v. Turnquest, S19A0157 at *38 (overruling Price v. State, 260 Ga. 2222 (1998)).
"Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts generally stand by their prior decisions, because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. Stare decisis, however, is not an inexorable command. Courts, like individuals, but with more caution and deliberation, must sometimes reconsider what has been already carefully considered, and rectify their own mistakes. In reconsidering our prior decisions, we must balance the importance of having the question decided against the importance of having it decided right. To that end, we have developed a test that [1] considers the age of precedent, [2] the reliance interests at stake, [3] the workability of the decision, and, most importantly, [4] the soundness of its reasoning. The soundness of a precedent’s reasoning is the most important factor." (citations and punctuation omitted) Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 244-245 (2017); see also Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
"Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law, particularly in the context of statutory interpretation where our incorrect decisions are more easily corrected by the democratic process. However, stare decisis is not an 'inexorable command' nor 'a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.' Stare decisis is instead a 'principle of policy.' In considering whether to reexamine a prior erroneous holding, we must balance the importance of having the question decided against the importance of having it decided right. In doing so, we consider factors such as [1] the age of the precedent, [2] the reliance interests at stake, [3] the workability of the decision, and, most importantly, [4] the soundness of its reasoning." (citations and punctuation omitted) State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658-659 (2010).
"Courts, like individuals, but with more caution and deliberation, must sometimes reconsider what has been already carefully considered, and rectify their own mistakes." Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
Constitutional Cases
"We have also said that stare decisis carries less weight when our prior precedent involved the interpretation of the Constitution, which is more difficult than statutory interpretation for the legislative process to correct. This doesn't mean that we disregard stare decisis altogether, though; what it actually means is that the first stare decisis factor (soundness of reasoning) becomes even more critical. The more wrong a prior precedent got the Constitution, the less room there is for the other factors to preserve it." Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2017) (citing Ga Dept. of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. 593, 601 (2014)).
1- The age of the precedent
- Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228 (overruling a 17 year old constitutional precedent)
- Ga Dept. of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. 593 (2014) (overruling a 19 year old sovereign immunity decision)
- Duke v. State, --- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019) (overruling 19 year old precedent)
- State v. Turnquest, S19A0157 at *38 (2019) (overruling a 21 year old decision)
- Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803 (2015) (overruling a 24 year old precedent)
- State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646 (2010) (overruling a 29 year old precedent)
- State v. Hudson, 293 Ga. 656 (2013) (overruling a 38 year old precedent)
- Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468 (2017) (overruling a 45 year old precedent)
2- The reliance interests at stake
"Substantial reliance interests are an important consideration for precedents involving contract and property rights, where parties may have acted in conformance with existing legal rules in order to conduct transactions.' " Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2017) (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) and Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 641 (2015)).
"To be sure, the State has some sort of interest in preserving [a case] so that pending [criminal cases] are not disturbed." Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2017).
In the constitutional context, in order to prevail over correctness as a value reliance interests must "outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional rights fully protected. If it is clear that a practice is unlawful, individuals' interest in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement entitlement to its persistence. 'The mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of [constitutional rights]." Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2017) (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349-350 (2009)).
"Price [a decision holding that police officers must inform DUI suspects they have the right to refuse to take breath tests] also created no reliance interests of the sort normally considered in stare decisis analysis." State v. Turnquest, S19A0157 at *39 (2019).
"The issue addressed by Waldrip 'is one of appellate procedure, not contract, property, or other substantive rights in which anyone has a significant reliance interest . . . the authority this Court claimed for itself in Waldrip has very rarely been cited in the years since Waldrip was decided' " Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
3- The workability of the decision
"Waldrip is unworkable for both appellate and trial courts. First, the reach of its rationale is limitless . . . . nothing in our law establishes the outer boundaries of appellate courts' discretion to exercise this power or gives litigants or trial courts any meaningful indication of how and under what circumstances appellate courts will exercise the power . . . Moreover, the discretion this Court claimed for appellate courts in Waldrip would seem to apply equally with regard to any statutory requirement for appeal . . . Waldrip presents significant workability problems for trial courts, as well . . . a trial courts has no means of prediting when a case may be snatched from its docket." Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
4- The soundness of the precedent's reasoning
"Although Price appears to be a decision of Georgia statutory law, Georgia Constitutional law, or both, it contains no discussion of any particular Georgia statute or constitutional provision. Neither our opinion in Price nor any of the authorities on which it relies contain any analysis of whether the language, history, and context of the Georgia Constitution required Miranda warnings as a matter of Georgia constitutional law; when such analysis is actually done, it is plain that the Georgia Constitution requires no such thing . . . to the extent that Price was based on the former OCGA 24-9-20, its holding has no basis in history or the text of that provision." State v. Turnquest, S19A0157 at *38 (overruling Price v. State, 260 Ga. 2222 (1998)).
Judicial Lawmaking Module
"It thus appears that Mallory's categorical exclusionary rule is best characterized as judicial lawmaking . . . based on the Court's view of good policy, operating only prospectively (like most legislation and unlike normal judicial decisions[]) . . . There are good reasons to doubt this court had the authority to promulgate such exclusionary evidence rules at all, at least after 1983." The State v. Orr, S18G0994 at *15-16 (Nahmias, PJ., writing for a unanimous Court).
"As this Court has made clear, the scheme for appellate interlocutory review is legislative in nature, and in the event that the General Assembly determines that the established framework does not adequately safeguard the interests' of litigants in particular classes of cases, it is for that body to change it. We reiterate this core separation of powers principle today. If and to the extent the General Assembly determines that that requiring a trial court to issue a timely certificate of immediate review before an interlocutory review process or is otherwise contrary to the public interest, then the General Assembly is free to change or abolish that requirement. But this Court lacks that authority, and we should never have claimed it." Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
"As this Court has made clear, the scheme for appellate interlocutory review is legislative in nature, and in the event that the General Assembly determines that the established framework does not adequately safeguard the interests' of litigants in particular classes of cases, it is for that body to change it. We reiterate this core separation of powers principle today. If and to the extent the General Assembly determines that that requiring a trial court to issue a timely certificate of immediate review before an interlocutory review process or is otherwise contrary to the public interest, then the General Assembly is free to change or abolish that requirement. But this Court lacks that authority, and we should never have claimed it." Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
New Evidence Code Module
"The new Evidence Code created a "new evidence world" in this State." The State v. Orr, S18G0994 at *17 (citing State v. Orr, Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 192 (2016)).
"The new code, which was modeled in large part on the Federal Rules of Evidence, is far more extensive and comprehensive than the statutes it replaced, and the General Assembly directed that 'courts are to look to the substantive law of evidence in Georgia [pre-2013]' . . . only when not displaced by the new code' that took effect on January 1, 2013." The State v. Orr, S18G0994 at *17 (citing State v. Almanza, 304 Ga. 553, 556 (2018) (in turn quoting the preamble to the new code, Ga. L. 2011, p. 100, and OCGA 24-1-2(e) ("Except as modified by statute, the common law as expounded by Georgia courts shall continue to be applied to the admission and exclusion of evidence and to procedures at trial."))).
"Where rules in the new Evidence Code are materially identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence, we look to federal appellate law, and in particular the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, to interpret them, instead of following our own precedent issued under the old Evidence Code." The State v. Orr, S18G0994 at *17; See also State v. Almanza, 304 Ga. 553, 556 (2018).
"The new code, which was modeled in large part on the Federal Rules of Evidence, is far more extensive and comprehensive than the statutes it replaced, and the General Assembly directed that 'courts are to look to the substantive law of evidence in Georgia [pre-2013]' . . . only when not displaced by the new code' that took effect on January 1, 2013." The State v. Orr, S18G0994 at *17 (citing State v. Almanza, 304 Ga. 553, 556 (2018) (in turn quoting the preamble to the new code, Ga. L. 2011, p. 100, and OCGA 24-1-2(e) ("Except as modified by statute, the common law as expounded by Georgia courts shall continue to be applied to the admission and exclusion of evidence and to procedures at trial."))).
"Where rules in the new Evidence Code are materially identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence, we look to federal appellate law, and in particular the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, to interpret them, instead of following our own precedent issued under the old Evidence Code." The State v. Orr, S18G0994 at *17; See also State v. Almanza, 304 Ga. 553, 556 (2018).
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