"Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts generally stand by their prior decisions, because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. Stare decisis, however, is not an inexorable command. Courts, like individuals, but with more caution and deliberation, must sometimes reconsider what has been already carefully considered, and rectify their own mistakes. In reconsidering our prior decisions, we must balance the importance of having the question decided against the importance of having it decided right. To that end, we have developed a test that [1] considers the age of precedent, [2] the reliance interests at stake, [3] the workability of the decision, and, most importantly, [4] the soundness of its reasoning. The soundness of a precedent’s reasoning is the most important factor." (citations and punctuation omitted) Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 244-245 (2017); see also Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
"Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law, particularly in the context of statutory interpretation where our incorrect decisions are more easily corrected by the democratic process. However, stare decisis is not an 'inexorable command' nor 'a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.' Stare decisis is instead a 'principle of policy.' In considering whether to reexamine a prior erroneous holding, we must balance the importance of having the question decided against the importance of having it decided right. In doing so, we consider factors such as [1] the age of the precedent, [2] the reliance interests at stake, [3] the workability of the decision, and, most importantly, [4] the soundness of its reasoning." (citations and punctuation omitted) State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658-659 (2010).
"Courts, like individuals, but with more caution and deliberation, must sometimes reconsider what has been already carefully considered, and rectify their own mistakes." Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
Constitutional Cases
"We have also said that stare decisis carries less weight when our prior precedent involved the interpretation of the Constitution, which is more difficult than statutory interpretation for the legislative process to correct. This doesn't mean that we disregard stare decisis altogether, though; what it actually means is that the first stare decisis factor (soundness of reasoning) becomes even more critical. The more wrong a prior precedent got the Constitution, the less room there is for the other factors to preserve it." Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2017) (citing Ga Dept. of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. 593, 601 (2014)).
1- The age of the precedent
- Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228 (overruling a 17 year old constitutional precedent)
- Ga Dept. of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. 593 (2014) (overruling a 19 year old sovereign immunity decision)
- Duke v. State, --- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019) (overruling 19 year old precedent)
- State v. Turnquest, S19A0157 at *38 (2019) (overruling a 21 year old decision)
- Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803 (2015) (overruling a 24 year old precedent)
- State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646 (2010) (overruling a 29 year old precedent)
- State v. Hudson, 293 Ga. 656 (2013) (overruling a 38 year old precedent)
- Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468 (2017) (overruling a 45 year old precedent)
2- The reliance interests at stake
"Substantial reliance interests are an important consideration for precedents involving contract and property rights, where parties may have acted in conformance with existing legal rules in order to conduct transactions.' " Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2017) (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) and Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 641 (2015)).
"To be sure, the State has some sort of interest in preserving [a case] so that pending [criminal cases] are not disturbed." Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2017).
In the constitutional context, in order to prevail over correctness as a value reliance interests must "outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional rights fully protected. If it is clear that a practice is unlawful, individuals' interest in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement entitlement to its persistence. 'The mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of [constitutional rights]." Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2017) (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349-350 (2009)).
"Price [a decision holding that police officers must inform DUI suspects they have the right to refuse to take breath tests] also created no reliance interests of the sort normally considered in stare decisis analysis." State v. Turnquest, S19A0157 at *39 (2019).
"The issue addressed by Waldrip 'is one of appellate procedure, not contract, property, or other substantive rights in which anyone has a significant reliance interest . . . the authority this Court claimed for itself in Waldrip has very rarely been cited in the years since Waldrip was decided' " Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
3- The workability of the decision
"Waldrip is unworkable for both appellate and trial courts. First, the reach of its rationale is limitless . . . . nothing in our law establishes the outer boundaries of appellate courts' discretion to exercise this power or gives litigants or trial courts any meaningful indication of how and under what circumstances appellate courts will exercise the power . . . Moreover, the discretion this Court claimed for appellate courts in Waldrip would seem to apply equally with regard to any statutory requirement for appeal . . . Waldrip presents significant workability problems for trial courts, as well . . . a trial courts has no means of prediting when a case may be snatched from its docket." Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
4- The soundness of the precedent's reasoning
"Although Price appears to be a decision of Georgia statutory law, Georgia Constitutional law, or both, it contains no discussion of any particular Georgia statute or constitutional provision. Neither our opinion in Price nor any of the authorities on which it relies contain any analysis of whether the language, history, and context of the Georgia Constitution required Miranda warnings as a matter of Georgia constitutional law; when such analysis is actually done, it is plain that the Georgia Constitution requires no such thing . . . to the extent that Price was based on the former OCGA 24-9-20, its holding has no basis in history or the text of that provision." State v. Turnquest, S19A0157 at *38 (overruling Price v. State, 260 Ga. 2222 (1998)).
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