Interlocutory Appeals: July 12

The Court granted an interlocutory appeal today:

S&S Towing & Recovery, Ltd. et al. v. Michael Charnota, asking the parties

"Does the second sentence of OCGA 51-2-7 violate procedural due process?"

OCGA 51-2-7 provides that "A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind who, by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at liberty, causes injury to another person who does not provoke the injury by his own act may be liable in damages to the person so injured. In proving vicious propensity, it shall be sufficient to show that the animal was required to be at heel or on a leash by an ordinance of a city, county, or consolidated government, and the said animal was at the time of the occurrence not at heal or on a leash."

Interlocutory Appeal Grant

The Court granted review today in S&S Towing & Recovery v. Charnota, asking "[d]oes the second sentence of OCGA 51-2-7 violate procedural due process?"

OCGA 51-2-7 deals with liability for injuries caused by vicious animals:

"A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind who, by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at liberty, causes injury to another person who does not provoke the injury by his own act may be liable in damages to the person so injured. In proving vicious propensity, it shall be sufficient to show that the animal was required to be at heel or on a leash by an ordinance . . . and the said animal was at the time of the occurrence not at heel or on a leash."

Succinctly: a person who keeps a dangerous animal is liable for injuries they cause if their carelessness allows the animal to cause harm, provided that the person injured did not provoke the animal. In Charnota, the Court has asked the parties to address whether it violates due process to allow dangerous propensity to be proven by showing the animal was supposed to be on a leash.

The case will likely be argued in early 2020.

New Interlocutory Appeal Grant

The Court granted an interlocutory appeal today in Raines v. The State, asking whether "a defendant facing a sentence of life without parole for an offense committed when he was a juvenile have a constitutional right to have a jury (as opposed to a judge) make the requisite determination of whether he is 'irreparably corrupt' or 'permanently incorrigible'?

The question deals with the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 640 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), holding that mandatory life without parole sentences violate the 8th Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and that a juvenile homicide offender cannot be sentenced to life without parole unless he is found to be 'irreparably corrupt' or 'permanently incorrigible.' "

Interlocutory Appeals

Today the Court granted an application for interlocutory appeal in Case No. S19I0848 Frederick Johnson v. The State, posing two questions:

1. Did the trial court properly interpret OCGA § 16-3-24.2 to conclude that Johnson, as a first-offender probationer, was not entitled to immunity on his claims of justification?

2. Did the trial court err in granting the State’s motion in limine to preclude Johnson from raising the defense of justification under OCGA § 16-3-21? See Sifuentes v. State, 293 Ga. 441, 444 (2) n.3 (2013); Hipp v. State, 293 Ga. 415, 418 (2013)

Applications for Interlocutory Appeal

Granted

Case No. S19I0595, City of Atlanta et al. v. Atlanta Independent School System

On February 18, the Justices unanimously granted the application for interlocutory review, and posed the following questions:

1. Is APS barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suing the city of Atlanta?
2. If APS is not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, does APS have standing to sue?
3. If APS is not barred from suit and has standing, did the trial court err when it denied the city of Atlanta's motion to dismiss on the merits? 

Timing note: when an application for IA is granted, the appellant must still file a notice of appeal with the trial court within ten days f the grant. The appellant's brief is then due within 20 days of the Court receiving the record from the trial court and docketing the case, and the appellee's brief is due either (1) within 40 days of docketing or (2) within 20 days of the filing of the appellant's brief, whichever is sooner. See rule 10.