"It thus appears that Mallory's categorical exclusionary rule is best characterized as judicial lawmaking . . . based on the Court's view of good policy, operating only prospectively (like most legislation and unlike normal judicial decisions[]) . . . There are good reasons to doubt this court had the authority to promulgate such exclusionary evidence rules at all, at least after 1983." The State v. Orr, S18G0994 at *15-16 (Nahmias, PJ., writing for a unanimous Court).
"As this Court has made clear, the scheme for appellate interlocutory review is legislative in nature, and in the event that the General Assembly determines that the established framework does not adequately safeguard the interests' of litigants in particular classes of cases, it is for that body to change it. We reiterate this core separation of powers principle today. If and to the extent the General Assembly determines that that requiring a trial court to issue a timely certificate of immediate review before an interlocutory review process or is otherwise contrary to the public interest, then the General Assembly is free to change or abolish that requirement. But this Court lacks that authority, and we should never have claimed it." Duke v. State,--- S.E.2d --2019 WL 2414686 (2019).
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