Notable Opinions: June 3rd

The Court issued two notable opinions today, one involving the procedure for granting a general demurrer, the other clarifying the "acceptance doctrine" in response to a certified question from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. 

The State v. Williams S19A0185

In Williams, the Court reversed the dismissal of a felony murder charge, holding that the trial court (by virtue of a number of pending motions being considered together) improperly considered evidence adduced at a hearing in granting a general demurrer. A general demurrer “challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment,” a court asks whether the defendant “can admit each and every fact alleged in the indictment and still be innocent of any crime.” In reasoning that a person does not "distribute" heroin within the meaning of OCGA 16-13-30(b) by simply injecting it into a consenting person, Justice Blackwell explained, the trial court relied on findings about the state's theory not evident on the face of the indictment. Importantly, the court clarified in a footnote, the procedural misstep did not necessarily mean the trial court incorrectly interpreted the statute. 

The full opinion is available at https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/s19a0185.pdf

Thomaston Acquisitions v. Piedmont Construction Group

In Thomaston Acquisitions, the Court addressed when the "acceptance doctrine" applies as a defense to negligent construction against subsequent purchasers of the property. In this case, Piedmont Construction Group ("PCG") sought to defend against Thomaston Acquisition's ("TA") claims of negligent construction. The United States District Court of the Middle District of Georgia certified the question to the Court, asking (1) whether the doctrine applied, and, if so, (2) to whom must the defect be "readily observable on reasonable inspection," the original owner, or the subsequent purchaser?

The acceptance doctrine provides that once a constructed property has been accepted by the buyer, the builder is not liable for subsequent injuries that would have been readily available on reasonable inspection. The Court held today that (1) the acceptance doctrine also applies against subsequent purchasers, even where a negligent construction plaintiff had no authority to inspect or accept it, and (2) that if the defect is "readily observable" to the original purchaser, the subsequent purchaser may not sue for negligent construction.

The doctrine applies against subsequent purchasers

 Writing for the Court, Justice Nahmias explained that "[a]fter the work has been accepted, a contractor generally has no authority to inspect or make changes to the property" and therefore where a defect is readily observable to the person who has the ability to inspect and repaid it, the builder is no longer fairly accountable. Critically, Justice Nahmias wrote, the Court's decision did not prevent the application of any of the recognized exceptions to the acceptance doctrine (liability to third parties for hidden defects; nuisance per se; inherently dangerous conditions, etc.), nor did it force subsequent buyers to subject themselves to the doctrine by purchasing property "as is." While many states have abandoned the acceptance doctrine in favor of a more lenient "forseeability" requirement, irrespective of privity, the Court reiterated its holding in Bragg v. Oxford Constr. Co., 285 Ga. 98, 101 (2009) that the acceptance doctrine would continue to be applied unless and until the General Assembly abolished it by statute. 

The defect need only be observable to the original purchaser

Since a builder loses the ability to inspect and control defects on the property once it is passed to the owner, the defect need only be readily observable to the original purchaser. After that point, the subsequent purchaser can look to the seller of the property for warranties and liabilities after the condition of the property. Thus, the Court held, a subsequent-purchaser plaintiff must show the defect was not readily observable to the original purchaser of the property. 

The full opinion is available at https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/s19q0249.pdf

Murder Convictions and Life Sentences

S18G0699. ADAMS v. THE STATE
S18G0947. NORDAHL v. THE STATE
S19A0095. DOZIER v. THE STATE
S19A0172. RIGSBY v. THE STATE
S19A0177. WALKER v. THE STATE
S19A0224. GOINS v. THE STATE
S19A0289. ROWLAND v. THE STATE
S19A0343. JACKSON v. THE STATE
S19A0366. BLACKMON v. THE STATE
S19A0428. BOWMAN v. THE STATE
S19A0565. GOLSON v. THE STATE


Disciplinary Matters

S19Y0706. IN THE MATTER OF JONNIE MAE GRAHAM
S19Y0959. IN THE MATTER OF PRESTON B. KUNDA