Cert Petitions: June 3rd

The Court granted cert in just one case today, asking about the proper procedure for challenging pre-indictment protection based on the argument that the applicable statute of limitations has expired.

In Davis v. State, 347 Ga. App. 757 (2018), Dewey Davis was identified in March 2009 by DNA evidence implicating him in a rape from 1996. Davis was incarcerated on other crimes until June 2016, at which point he was briefly released before being detained (without indictment) on the rape charge. Davis filed a plea in bar alleging that he could not be prosecuted because the statute of limitations had run.

The Court of Appeals granted Davis's application for an interlocutory appeal, and held that a plea in bar was not the proper mechanism to challenge pre-indictment detention. OCGA 17-7-110 provides that pretrial motions like special pleas shall be filed within ten days of arraignment; in the absence of arraignment, the Court of Appeals reasoned, there could be no valid motion.

Instead, Judge Ray wrote, illegal detentions should be challenged using a writ of habeas corpus. Unlike a plea in bar, the writ is expressly intended as a mechanism to challenge the lawfulness of present confinement.

Judge McFadden dissented, arguing that Davis had been "charged" in the sense that he had been arrested on suspicion of a particular crime. While 17-7-110 establishes the deadline for filing a plea in bar, it does not set a date before which a motion may not be filed. Indeed, Judge McFadden argued, the Uniform Superior Court rules provide that "motions, demurrers, and special pleadings shall be made and filed at or before the time set by law." See USCR 31.1. Thus, even if a writ of habeas corpus was an appropriate remedy, so too was a plea in bar.

The order granting cert asks the following questions:

1. What is the appropriate method for an individual who has been detained but not yet indicted to challenge his pre-indictment detention on the basis that prosecution for the offense or offenses he is alleged to have committed is barred by an applicable statute of limitation?

2. Was Williams v. Reece, 288 Ga. 46, 47 (701 SE2d 188) (2010), correct when it stated that, because a claim by an unindicted detainee “that the statute of limitation for his indictment has expired” may be “raised in [his] pending prosecution, the claim may not serve as the basis for pre-trial habeas corpus relief”?


Justice Blackwell dissented from granting the petition.

The case will be set for the September 2019 Oral Argument Calendar.


Denied Petitions

S19C0293. WHITAKER FARMS, LLC v. FITZGERALD FRUIT FARMS, LLC (A18A1420)
S19C0294. WHITAKER FARMS, LLC v. FITZGERALD FRUIT FARMS, LLC (A18A1421)
S19C0341. PATTON v. CUMBERLAND CORPORATION (A18A1216)
S19C0363. GEORGIA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. REECE et al. (A18A1207)
S19C0375. CONNER v. THE STATE (A18A1023)
S19C0382. GUZZARDO v. MORONESE (A18A1096, A18A1097)
S19C0387. SAILEM v. THE STATE (A18A1012)
S19C0388. SEVCIK v. SMART (A19D0072)
S19C0395. SUNDY v. FRIENDSHIP PAVILION ACQUISITION CO. et al. (A19D0108)
S19C0401. BROWNING v. RABURN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS et al. (A18A0906)
S19C0403. REMLINGER v. CITY OF WOODSTOCK (A18A1237)
S19C0405. STEEDLEY v. STEEDLEY (A19A0326)
S19C0406. MALIBU BOATS, LLC et al. v. BATCHELDER et al. (A18A0881)
S19C0408. JOHNSON v. THE STATE (A19A0094, A19A0095)
S19C0467. BRANTLEY v. THE STATE (A18A2019)
S19C0974. 365 MARKET PLACE, LLC v. GSRAN-Z, LLC et al. (A18A2157)