Cert Petitions: October 7, 2019

The court granted cert in three cases today: the first deals with conflicting doctrines of recovery in workers compensation law; the second deals with certification of class actions; and the third deals with the prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers Compensation

Frett is a workers compensation case involving the compensability of injuries that occur when an employee is on their way out of the building to take a regularly scheduled lunch break.

The general rule is that in order for an injured employee to recover under workers compensation laws, their injury must arise out of the course of their employment. Frett brings to the Court a conflict between two doctrines dealing with just when an employee is and is not acting "within the course of their employment." On the one hand, the "lunch break" exception holds that an employee is not acting pursuant to their employment when they are taking a scheduled lunch break. This is because an employee taking a lunch break is not pursuing any aim or goal of the employer's, even if they are still on the employer's property. By contrast, the "ingress/egress rule" says that preparations at the place of employment to begin work or leave it are within the scope of employment. The two conflict because the Court of Appeals has applied the ingress/egress rule to situations where an employee is going to or returning from a regularly scheduled lunch break.

Frett brings this conflict to a head: the employee here slipped in a break room where she was preparing her lunch before going outside (and off company property) to eat her lunch. The administrative law judge awarded temporary total disability benefits, but the Court of Appeals reversed -- disapproving the cases applying the ingress/egress rule to regularly scheduled lunch breaks. In addition to producing inconsistent results over time, those cases produced a paradox, the court said, by giving protection to an employee leaving the premises for a lunch break -- while denying it to an employee who eats at their desk.

The Court asked the parties to address "[w]hether the 'ingress/egress' rule applies to the "scheduled break" rule in cases under the Workers' Compensation Act?"

Justice Peterson dissented from the grant of certiorari. Justices Bethel and Ellington will not participate in the case.

The case will be added to the February 2020 oral argument calendar.


Bowden et al. v. The Medical Center, Inc. (and vice versa)

Bowden is a class action action against a Columbus, Georgia Healthcare provider, brought by uninsured patients ("the Patients") who were treated at The Medical Center ("TMC") after car accidents. Because these patients were uninsured, TMC sought repayment by imposing a lien on any tort recovery the patients might obtain in lawsuits concerning the accidents.

Bowden, the named plaintiff in the suit, initiated the lawsuit claiming that the amount charged for medical care was unreasonable and therefore thus the amount on the lien excessive. The trial court granted class certification, denied TMCs motion to exclude the Patients' expert witness, and denied their motion for summary judgement.

The Court of Appeals affirmed on the first two points, but held that summary judgement should have been granted against at the Plaintiffs' claims under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("UDTPA") and the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). The Court of Appeals Opinion is available here.

The Court asked the parties to address the following questions:

1. Did the Court of Appeals err in its determination that class certification was proper?

2. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the denial of summary judgment for The Medical Center, Inc. on common law claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation?

3. Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the denial of summary judgment for The Medical Center, Inc. on the claims under the Georgia RICO Act, OCGA § 16-14-1 et seq.?
All the Justices concurred in granting cert except Justices Boggs and Peterson, who will not participate.



The State v. Heath

Heath deals with a classic issue in criminal appeals: the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Heath was convicted of numerous counts of homicide by vehicle in various degrees and, relevant to the Cert grant, contended her trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective based on the failure to file a demurrer to defective portions of the indictment.

An ineffective assistance claim only prevails where the appellant can show both that their counsel was deficient and that, but for those errors, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of their trial would have been different. Here, the indictments did not allege either reckless driving or driving under the influence. Thus, Heath contends, she could have admitted all the allegations charged -- and still not been guilty of a crime. As a result, the failure of her trial counsel to file the general demurrer is both deficient and prejudicial.

The Court asked the parties to address the following question:

Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that trial counsel’s failure to file a general demurrer resulted in prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)? Compare Walker v. State, 329 Ga. App. 369 (3) (a) (765 SE2d 599) (2014), with Everhart v. State, 337 Ga. App. 348 (3) (a) (786 SE2d 866) (2016); Youngblood v. State, 253 Ga. App. 327 (3) (558 SE2d 854) (2002).



Denied

S19C0885. STARDUST, 3007 LLC et al. v. CITY OF BROOKHAVEN (A18A1958, A19A0228)
S19C0922. OKEFENOKEE EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE, INC. v. ORTEGA (A18A1662)
S19C0832. REID v. REID (A18A1498)
S19C0840. COLE v. THE STATE (A18A1691)
S19C0853. PITTMAN v. SUMMIT RESTAURANT DEVELOPMENT, LLC (A18A1988)
S19C0857. LAMB v. NELMS (A19A0822)
S19C0867. KUMICHEL et al. v. CLARK et al. (A19I0153)
S19C0875. GEORGIA APPRECIATION PROPERTY, INC. v. RUTLEDGE et al. (A18A1490)
S19C0877. HARTLEY v. THE STATE (A18A1431)
S19C0881. FRASIER et al. v. SHAH et al. (A18A2002)
S19C0887. DIXIT v. DIXIT (A18A1628)
S19C0911. ROBBINS v. DOZIER (A19D0322)