Notable Opinions August 5

The Court issued one notable opinion today, dealing with the double jeopardy implications of improper statements made by a prosecutor during closing argument.

State v. Jackson


In Jackson, the Court affirmed a trial court's decision that double-jeopardy barred the re-trial of Monquez Jackson for murder based on the court's "considerable discretion." The trial court granted a mistrial based on improper comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments and, determining those comments were made for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, held that the state was constitutionally barred from retrying the case.

The case on appeal dealt with the DA's decision not to call one of two witnesses to the alleged homicide. Based on the decision not to call the witness, the defense argued in closing the jury should infer the witness's testimony would have been adverse to the state. In response, the DA told the jury what the witness would have told them, which, of course, was not based on facts admitted into evidence. Despite agreeing that the statements were reasonable inferences based on the testimony of another witness, the trial court ultimately agreed with the defense that a mistrial was the only appropriate remedy. The court further ruled that double jeopardy barred subsequent prosecution, finding based on "shifting and conflicting explanations" that the comments were made intentionally to trigger a mistrial in hope of a second attempt.

The Supreme Court affirmed both rulings.

First, "[a] decision whether to grant a mistrial based on an improper argument is reserved to the broad discretion of the trial court," Justice Peterson wrote for the court, and "whether a remedy . . . is sufficient depends on the degree of prejudice created by the comment" involving "consideration of the weight of the evidence." Thus, appellate courts will affirm that decision if "reasonable judges could differ about proper disposition." Here, the Court held, the trial judge's grant of the mistrial was reasonable because the state did more than ask the jury not to consider what the witness would have said, but instead told the jury what the witness would have said (arguably only part of it), all in light of "not incontrovertible" evidence against the defendant. Thus, Justice Peterson wrote, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the mistrial.

Second, "[a]lthough the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause generally does not bar the state from retrying a case after a mistrial is granted at the defense's request due to prosecutorial misconduct, a retrial may be barred where the misconduct was intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial." Whether this was the prosecutor's intent "is a question of fact that will not be overruled unless clearly erroneous." Here, the trial court concluded the DA intentionally caused the mistrial based on the inference that an experienced prosecutor would know the comments in question could cause a mistrial, particularly in light of the fact that the evidence of guilt was only moderate. Thus, given the discretion owed to a trial court's double jeopardy determination, the decision to bar subsequent prosecution was not clear error.

The full opinion is available here


Murder Convictions and Life Sentences

S19A0508. EVANS v. THE STATE
S19A0509. RHYNES v. THE STATE
S19A0598. SCOTT v. THE STATE
S19A0611. GUDE v. THE STATE
S19A0643. DAVIS v. THE STATE
S19A0665. DERRICO v. THE STATE
S19A0669. CAIN v. THE STATE
S19A0686. VICTORIA v. THE STATE
S19A0739. CHEEVES v. THE STATE
S19A0741. ABNEY V. THE STATE
S19A0765. LEWIS v. THE STATE
S19A0809. COLLINS v. THE STATE
S19A0846. WELCH v. THE STATE
S19A0861. JACKSON v. THE STATE
S19A0868. CHAPMAN v. THE STATE
S19A0882. GRAVES v. THE STATE
S19A0886. SHUBERT v. THE STATE
S19A0899. MORTON v. THE STATE
S19A0985, S19A0986. MOORE v. THE STATE (two cases)
S19Y1164, S19Y1165, S197166. IN THE MATTER OF JEFFREY L. SAKAS (three cases)


Attorney Discipline Cases

S19Y1164 IN THE MATTER OF JEFFREY L. SAKAS (three cases)