Notable Opinions: March 4, 2019

Park v. State (S18A1211)

In Park, the Court unanimously struck down the requirement that "Sexually Dangerous Predators" who have completed their criminal sentences remain on electronic monitoring for the rest of their lives. 

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Melton held that Georgia Code § 42-1-14 (e) “authorizes a patently unreasonable search that runs afoul of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . at least with respect to individuals who have completed their criminal sentences.” Under 14(e), that search included “[t]he permanent application of a monitoring device and the collection of data by the State about an individual’s whereabouts 24 hours a day, seven days a week, through warrantless GPS monitoring for the rest of that individual’s life." The Court rejected the State's argument that offenders covered by 14(e) have such a diminished expectation of privacy as to make the search reasonable, because the purpose of collecting the data  was “to collect evidence of potential criminal wrongdoing that can later be used against the individuals being searched." The Court noted that similar statutes in other states which have passed "constitutional muster" imposed a monitoring requirement as part of either the sentence itself, or their probation or parole. 

Justice Blackwell wrote separately to say that the Court's opinion in Park “does not foreclose other means by which the General Assembly might put the same policy into practice.” Nothing in the decision, for example, “precludes the General Assembly from authorizing life sentences for the worst sexual offenders . . . [nor] prevents the General Assembly from requiring a sentencing court in the worst cases to require GPS monitoring as a condition of permitting a sexual offender to serve part of a life sentence on probation.” Georgia law already permits persons convicted of offenses like forcible rape or aggravated child molestation to be sentenced to imprisonment or probation for life, and permits judges to require such offenders to wear electronic monitoring devices as a condition of probation. According to Justice Blackwell, “[n]othing in our decision today calls the constitutionality of these sentencing laws into question.” Thus, Park “does not foreclose the possibility that the General Assembly could (at least prospectively) authorize or require that the worst sexual offenders be subjected to GPS monitoring for life as a condition of a sentence of probation for life.” 

For the full opinion, see https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/s18a1211.pdf


Fulton County v. City of Atlanta et al. (S18A1156)

In Fulton, the Court unanimously upheld the City of Atlanta’s 2017 of property located within the Fulton County Industrial District, finding that a 1979 local constitutional amendment that would have prohibited the annexation violated the Single subject rule. 

Under the single subject rule, "when one or more amendment is submitted [to the electorate] at the same time, they shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately," except that "proposal[s] for changes . . . within a single article" and "proposal[s] . . . for changes within a single article and a related change in . . . other Articles" may be submitted as a single amendment.

Writing for the Court, Justice Blackwell held that, because the amendment in question made changes to two different Articles of the constitution (local tax matters, Article VIII Section VII Paragraph 1; and special districts/local governments, Article IX Section IV Paragraph 2) the amendment could only be permissible if the changes were "related." In rejecting the County's argument that the sole objective of the amendment was the creation of the Fulton Industrial District, to which end the revocation of a prior school tax amendment was intended to clarify the tax burden of properties within the District, Justice Blackwell wrote that the court "fail[ed] to see how a provision that would prohibit the County from levying a school tax anywhere within the City has anything to do with [creating] the District." Succinctly, "because the 1979 amendment provided that there could be no overlap between the District and the City, the taxation of properties in the City did not (and could not) relate to the creation of the District." 

For the full opinion, see https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/s18a1156.pdf  


Conley, Warden, v. Pate (S18A1121)

In Conley, the Court reversed a lower court ruling that a young man's 20-year prison sentence for statutory rape and aggravated assault were“cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States and Georgia Constitutions.  

Following a trial in April 2010, a jury found Pate guilty of statutory rape, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during commission of a felony. Pate was sentenced to 20 years in prison for the statutory rape followed by 25 years on probation for the other convictions. After the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld his conviction, Pate filed a habeas petition in which he raised, among other things, an Eighth Amendment claim. The lower court agreed, finding that Pate’s “youth, immaturity, and impulsivity should have been considered during charging and sentencing,” and described a 20-year sentence for statutory rape “grossly disproportionate” as both he and his victim were below the age of consent.”

Writing for the Court, Justice Blackwell noted that “the habeas court’s inference of gross disproportionality rested principally on its view that the conduct underlying Pate’s conviction for statutory rape was merely ‘consensual sex with an individual younger than him’ and was only a ‘passive felony.’" The record, however, showed that after repeatedly refusing to have sex with Pate, the victim gave in only after he brandished a knife and threatened to kill her father. “To call such conduct ‘consensual sex’ and only a ‘passive felony’" Justice Blackwell wrote, "is to grossly mischaracterize what Pate did to [the victim].”  As such, “Pate’s sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment for statutory rape does not meet even the threshold inference of gross disproportionality." 

Justice Peterson wrote separately to say that, though he agreed with the judgement, he is “skeptical that our analytical approach to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Georgia Constitution is consistent with the original public meaning of that clause.” Going back to 1872, the Court had understood the Georgia Constitution to say that “so long as [the General Assembly does] not provide cruel and unusual punishments, such as disgraced the civilization of former ages, and make one shudder with horror to read of them, as drawing, quartering, burning, etc., the Constitution does not put any limit upon legislative discretion.” By contrast, in the 1970s the United States Supreme Court shifted its approach to consider "evolving standards of decency," and, after that Court invalidated Georgia's death penalty, the Georgia Supreme Court followed suit in interpreting it's own constitution. “It seems to me quite likely that such an approach cannot be squared with the original public meaning of the Georgia Constitution, and if it cannot, we should reconsider our approach in the proper case.”

For the full opinion, see https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/s18a1121.pdf


Other cases


S18G0756. Chappius et al. v. Ortho Sport & Spine Physicians Savannah, LLC (elaborating on the standard for a trial court evaluating whether to a party’s § 9-11-12 (f) motion to strike matter from a pleading on the ground that it is “scandalous").  

https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/s18g0756.pdf

S18G1033. Hanham v. Access Management Group L.P. (reinstating a trial court's decision to deny a motion for directed verdict on a breach of contract claim, rejecting analysis by the court of appeals suggesting that a breach of contract claim can never arise from obligations outside the written contract, even if  those obligations are established by the parties' course of conduct).

https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/s18g1033.pdf

S18A1322. Chambers v. Hall, Warden. (affirming in part and reversing in part a habeas court's judgement, finding that there was sufficient evidence of movement of the victim to support a kidnapping conviction, and concluding  the count charging Chambers with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merged into his conviction for armed robbery). 

https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/s18a1322.pdf

S18A1396. Cartwright v. Caldwell, Warden. (Reversing a habeas court's denial of relief based on the finding that appellate counsel was ineffective for failure to introduce evidence implicating trial counsel's conduct in failing to impeach the prosecution's key witness). 

https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/s18a1396.pdf

S18A1593. Beck v. The State (vacating convictions for felony murder and posession of a weapon during the commission of a crime because, in light of Georgia's new evidence code, the trial court failed to consider the proper rule (606(b) in evaluating Beck's claim that he was entitled to a new trial).

https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/s18a1593.pdf


Murder Convictions, Life Sentences, etc.

The Court's Public Information Office also reports that the  has upheld murder convictions and life prison sentences in:

Crouch v. The State (S18A1610)

Favors v. The State (S18A1394)

Jackson v. The State (S18A1598)

McCord v. The State (S18A1045)

Overton v. The State (S18A1273)

Price v. The State (S18A1491)

Stanford v. The State (S18A1609)


Tuggle v. The State   (S19A0296)


Tyner v. The State (S18A1071)


Disciplinary opinions

The court rejected a petition for reinstatement In the Matter of Alvis Melvin Moore (S19Y0552)