Innovative Images LLC v. Summerville
Innovative Images involves a legal malpractice action where the defendant law firm sought to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, holding the arbitration clause included in the engagement agreement was unenforceable. The trial court reasoned that legal ethics rules required lawyers to explain the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration to their client before entering into arbitration.
The Court of Appeals reversed, noting that even if the trial court had correctly interpretation the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, those rules could not be imported into the analysis of whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable or violated public policy.
The Court asked the parties to address two questions:
(1) Under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, is an attorney
required to fully apprise his or her client of the advantages and
disadvantages of arbitration before including a clause mandating
binding arbitration of legal malpractice claims in the parties’
engagement agreement?
(2) If so, does failing to so apprise a client render such a clause
unenforceable under Georgia law?
Justices Blackwell and Boggs dissented from the grant of certiorari.
The case will be assigned to the April 2020 oral argument calendar.
The Court of Appeals opinion is available here.
Mendez v. Moats et al
Mendez deals with the application of Georgia's ante litem notice (a requirement to sue state or county officials) to lawsuits against a county sheriff, in their official capacity, for negligent use of a motor vehicle.
Mendez sued the Polk County Sheriff (in his official capacity) and one of his deputies (in both her individual and official capacities) alleging that the Deputy's negligent use of her police vehicle had caused an accident in which he was injured.
As relevant here: the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Mendez's suit was barred because he had not properly send an ante-litem notice to the defendants. Mendez had, in fact, sent an ante-litem notice, but he sent it to the Chairman of the Polk County Board of Commissioners, rather than the sheriff himself. The defendants argued that because Mendez had not sent the notice to the Polk County Sheriff's department, his claims against both the Sheriff and the Deputy were barred.
The trial court denied the motion, but the en banc Court of Appeals reversed. The county provision of the ante litem notice provides "[a]ll claims against counties must be presented within 12 months after they accrue or become payable or the same are barred." O.C.G.A. 36-11-1. Writing for the Court, Judge Dillard wrote that recent Court of Appeals decisions hold the ante-litem notice applies to both counties and sheriffs as legally distinct entities, and so service of the notice on one is not service on the other.
Writing for the dissenting Judges, Judge Doyle wrote that a suit against the Sheriff in his official capacity was essentially a suit against the county, and therefore the proper defendant had been served with the ante-litem notice.
The Court asked the parties to address two questions:
(1) Does OCGA § 36-11-1 apply to official-capacity claims
against a county sheriff for negligent use of a covered motor
vehicle?
(2) If so, does the proper presentment of such claims to the
county commission satisfy the claimant’s duty under the statute?
Justices Blackwell, Peterson, Warren, and Ellington dissented from the grant of certiorari.
The case will be added to the April 2020 oral argument calendar.
The Court of Appeals opinion is available here.
Atlanta Women Specialists et al LLC v. Trabue et al
Editor's note: Case summaries will be available soon
The Court asked the parties to address two questions:
(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in determining that the
plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claims against Atlanta Women’s
Specialists, LLC based on Dr. Simonsen’s conduct were sufficiently
pled?
(2) Did the Court of Appeals err in determining that, in order to
seek apportionment of damages with regard to the negligence of
Dr. Simonsen, the defendants were required to comply with OCGA
§ 51-12-33 (d)?
Angus v. Trabue et al
Editor's note: Case summaries will be available soon
The Court asked the parties to address two questions:
(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in determining that the
plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claims against Atlanta Women’s
Specialists, LLC based on Dr. Simonsen’s conduct were sufficiently
pled?
(2) Did the Court of Appeals err in determining that, in order to seek apportionment of damages with regard to the negligence of
Dr. Simonsen, the defendants were required to comply with OCGA
§ 51-12-33 (d)?
Grant, Vacate, and Remand
COBB HOSPITAL, INC. d/b/a WELLSTAR COBB HOSPITAL et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH et al.
The Court issued one grant, vacate, and remand today ("GVR" see See
Supreme Court Rule 50 (2); Scott v. State, 306 Ga. 507, 507 n.1 (832 SE2d 426)
(2019)).
In Cobb Hospital, Inc. v. Department of Community Health, 349 Ga. App. 452, 465 (2019). The Court of Appeals held that Cobb Hopsital and Kennestone hospital had failed to preserve their constitutional due process claims because those claims were not ruled on in the underlying administrative proceeding.
The Court granted the GVR, reasoning that so long as the party properly raises its constitutional claims
during the administrative process, the claims may later be raised in
and reviewed by the trial court - even if the administrative agency did not have authority to reach them.
Denied
S19C0441. BURKES v. THE STATE (A18A0821)
S19C1070. DANIELS v. THE STATE (A18A1865)
S19C1073. GRANT v. THE STATE (A18A1629)
S19C1077. HAWXHURST v. SAGE ATLANTA PROPERTIES, LTD (A18A2081)
S19C1080. SUNTRUST BANK v. BICKERSTAFF (A18A1519)
S19C1082. SCHAFFELD v. SCHAFFELD (A18A1947)
S19C1091. KUSHNER et al. v. LAYMAC (A18A1536)
S19C1093. KUMAR v. ROCHON et al.(A18A1574)
S19C1102. ALLI v. YORKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC (A19D0255)
S19C1104. COLEMAN v. THE STATE (A18A1910)
S19C1106. SAMACA, LLC v. CELLAIRIS FRANCHISE, INC. et al. (A19D0372)
S20C0114. SAMACA, LLC v. CELLAIRIS FRANCHISE, INC. et al. (A19D0539)
S19C1119. COBBLE v. LOCKHART et al. (A19D0298)
S19C1132. COHEN et al. v. ROGERS (A16A1716, A16A1717)
S19C1144. DAN-FODIO et al. v. WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB (A19A1233)
S19C1161. SMITH v. POLK et al. (A19D0410)
S19C1170. DUPREE et al. v. ROGERS (A16A1714, A16A1715)
S19C1175. MORGAN et al. v. MORGAN (A19A0239)
S19C1180. SPOTTSVILLE v. ADAMS et al. (A19D0359)
S19C1191. SOLOMON v. THE STATE (A19D0388)
S19C1199. KAPPELMEIER v. BRIDGE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT d/b/a PROMENADE AT BERKELEY (A19E0048)
S19C1220. YIM et al. v. CARR (A19A0716)
S19C1229. NAAR v. NAAR (A19A0560)
S19C1230. MARTIN v. THE STATE (A19A0025)
S19C1242. SIARAH ATLANTA HWY, LLC v. NEW ERA VENTURES, LLC (A19A0724, A19A0725)
S19C1243. BEACHAM v. BEACHAM (A19A1638)
S19C1246. WHITE v. FULTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT (A19A0773)
S19C1260. ULBRICH v. GA. COMPOSITE MEDICAL BOARD (A19D0361)
S19C1270. TRAMMEL et al. v. TRAMMEL (A19A0634)
S19C1272. JOHNSON v. THE STATE (A18A0990)
S19C1274. HAMLETT v. THE STATE (A19A0141)
S19C1275. HAMLETT v. THE STATE (A19A0142)
S19C1276. SMITH v. THE STATE (A19D0423)
S19C1289. DICKERSON v. BROWN (A19A1016)
S19C1292. HUSSAIN v. MARIETTA HALAL MEAT et al. (A19A0043)
S19C1297. KIMBROUGH v. THE STATE (A19A1482)
S19C1305. WHITE v. THE STATE (A19A0504)
S19C1317. GUERRERO-MOYA v. THE STATE (A19A0601)
S19C1318. GARRETT v. THE STATE (A19I0243)
S19C1320. THOMPSON v. THE STATE (A19A0416)
S19C1321. PORTER v. THE STATE (A19D0463)
S19C1322. STEPHENS v. THE STATE (A19D0470)
S19C1333. MARCUS v. MARCUS (A19A1958)
S19C1338. HARRISON v. THE STATE (A19A0196)
S19C1349. HILL et al. v. THE STATE (A19I0239)
S19C1356. NEAL v. DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH et al. (A19A0227, A19A0369)
S19C1392. WEST v. THE LIGON FIRM, P.C. (A19D0488)
S19C1395. MURILLO v. THE STATE (A19A0879)
S19C1406. GRAY et al. v. HAMILTON STATE BANK (A19A0635)
S19C1425. PATTERSON v. THE STATE (A19A0085)
S19C1440. HUNT v. DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS (A19E0061)
S19C1458. CABAN v. THE STATE (A19A0126)
S20C0152. HUNT v. DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY (A19A2382)
S20C0182. BEACHAM v. BEACHAM (A19D0565)
S20C0407. BEACHAM v. BEACHAM (A20A0235)
Tuesday, December 24, 2019
Monday, December 23, 2019
Notable Opinions: December 23
The Court issued two notable opinions today: the first dealing with data breach litigation, the second with whether federal regulations may preclude an action under a federal statute.
Collins deals with the ability of plaintiffs to bring claims against allegedly negligent companies following a data breach in which the plaintiffs' information was compromised. Specifically, whether plaintiffs who have not yet suffered identity theft have nonetheless sufficiently alleged "harm" to survive a motion to dismiss.
Background
In Collins, a group of clinic patients brought a class action suit alleging negligence and related claims arising out of the data breach of the clinic's computer systems by a hacker known as the "Dark Overlord." The plaintiffs alleged "[a]s a direct and proximate result of [AOC's] negligence, Plaintiffs and other class members have suffered, or will suffer, damages, including the cost of identity theft protection and/or credit monitoring services and the costs associated with placing and maintaining a credit freeze on their accounts." See Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, 347 Ga. App. 13, 15 (2018). The trial court granted Athens Orthopedic Clinic (AOC)'s motion to dismiss without identifying the specific basis for the dismissal.
The Decision Below
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, explaining that "[w]hile we have never addressed directly whether prophylactic costs anticipated or incurred to protect oneself against the threat of identity theft following a data breach constitute "loss or damage," in prior cases the Court had said that harm relating to wrongful disclosure of sensitive information was "too speculative to form the basis of recovery." See id. (citations omitted). Further, in toxic tort cases the Court had held that an "increased risk of cancer" and the need for "monitoring [for the development of adverse health consequences] in the future," were insufficient to state a cognizable claim under Georgia law. Thus "as in the context of medical monitoring in toxic tort cases, prophylactic measures such as credit monitoring and identity theft protection and their associated costs" are not "compensable injury" sufficient to support a negligence claim.
Judge McFadden dissented in part, arguing the majority opinion should not have pretermitted standing and simply dismissed for failure to state a claim. Judge McFadden would have reversed the trial court's undifferentiated dismissal on a finding that the plaintiff's did have standing, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The Court's Decision
Writing for the Court, Justice Peterson held that the Plaintiffs had indeed alleged cognizable injury. The caselaw the Court of Appeals relied on in their decision below, Justice Peterson wrote, was inapplicable for two reasons. First, those decisions were not issued in the context of a motion to dismiss. As a result, the failure of Plaintiffs in those cases to produce evidence of harm did not necessarily mean that the Plaintiff's in this case could not adequately allege harm along the same lines. Second, none of the Court of Appeals' previous data breach cases had dealt with deliberate criminal theft for the purpose of selling the data to other criminals. As a result, whereas in those cases "[t]o conclude that the claimants [in those cases] would likely suffer identity theft as a result of the opposing parties' actions would have required a long series of speculative inferences," here, no such inferential chain was necessary. As the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit put it "[w]hy else would hackers break into a store's database and steal consumers' private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers' identities." Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015).
Thus, the Court held, data breach plaintiffs may be able to allege cognizable harm. "Construing the plaintiffs’ allegations — particularly that criminals are able to assume their identities fraudulently as a result of the data breach and that the risk of such identity theft is 'imminent and substantial' — in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we cannot say that the plaintiffs will not be able to introduce sufficient evidence of injury within the framework of the complaint."
Importantly, Justice Peterson explained that the Court's decision did not depend on the allegation that they had spent money on measures like identity theft protection: "[a]lthough this may represent all or some measure of the plaintiffs’ damages to date, their allegation that the criminal theft of their personal data has left them at an imminent and substantial risk of identity theft is sufficient at this stage of the litigation."
Background
In Collins, a group of clinic patients brought a class action suit alleging negligence and related claims arising out of the data breach of the clinic's computer systems by a hacker known as the "Dark Overlord." The plaintiffs alleged "[a]s a direct and proximate result of [AOC's] negligence, Plaintiffs and other class members have suffered, or will suffer, damages, including the cost of identity theft protection and/or credit monitoring services and the costs associated with placing and maintaining a credit freeze on their accounts." See Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, 347 Ga. App. 13, 15 (2018). The trial court granted Athens Orthopedic Clinic (AOC)'s motion to dismiss without identifying the specific basis for the dismissal.
The Decision Below
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, explaining that "[w]hile we have never addressed directly whether prophylactic costs anticipated or incurred to protect oneself against the threat of identity theft following a data breach constitute "loss or damage," in prior cases the Court had said that harm relating to wrongful disclosure of sensitive information was "too speculative to form the basis of recovery." See id. (citations omitted). Further, in toxic tort cases the Court had held that an "increased risk of cancer" and the need for "monitoring [for the development of adverse health consequences] in the future," were insufficient to state a cognizable claim under Georgia law. Thus "as in the context of medical monitoring in toxic tort cases, prophylactic measures such as credit monitoring and identity theft protection and their associated costs" are not "compensable injury" sufficient to support a negligence claim.
Judge McFadden dissented in part, arguing the majority opinion should not have pretermitted standing and simply dismissed for failure to state a claim. Judge McFadden would have reversed the trial court's undifferentiated dismissal on a finding that the plaintiff's did have standing, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The Court's Decision
Writing for the Court, Justice Peterson held that the Plaintiffs had indeed alleged cognizable injury. The caselaw the Court of Appeals relied on in their decision below, Justice Peterson wrote, was inapplicable for two reasons. First, those decisions were not issued in the context of a motion to dismiss. As a result, the failure of Plaintiffs in those cases to produce evidence of harm did not necessarily mean that the Plaintiff's in this case could not adequately allege harm along the same lines. Second, none of the Court of Appeals' previous data breach cases had dealt with deliberate criminal theft for the purpose of selling the data to other criminals. As a result, whereas in those cases "[t]o conclude that the claimants [in those cases] would likely suffer identity theft as a result of the opposing parties' actions would have required a long series of speculative inferences," here, no such inferential chain was necessary. As the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit put it "[w]hy else would hackers break into a store's database and steal consumers' private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers' identities." Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015).
Thus, the Court held, data breach plaintiffs may be able to allege cognizable harm. "Construing the plaintiffs’ allegations — particularly that criminals are able to assume their identities fraudulently as a result of the data breach and that the risk of such identity theft is 'imminent and substantial' — in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we cannot say that the plaintiffs will not be able to introduce sufficient evidence of injury within the framework of the complaint."
Importantly, Justice Peterson explained that the Court's decision did not depend on the allegation that they had spent money on measures like identity theft protection: "[a]lthough this may represent all or some measure of the plaintiffs’ damages to date, their allegation that the criminal theft of their personal data has left them at an imminent and substantial risk of identity theft is sufficient at this stage of the litigation."
Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Hartry et al
Norfolk Southern poses the question of whether claims under the Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA") are precluded by regulations issued pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA") - the Court held today they are not.
Background
In June 2010 the gates at a public railway crossing were down for an extended period of time, such that cars approaching the crossing began to simply drive around them in the belief no trains were approaching. One such driver pulled around the gates, causing an accident which injured Harty, the train's driver (and Plaintiff in the case).
Proceedings Below
As relevant here, Hartry sued Norfolk Southern under FELA alleging it had failed to maintain the crossing gates, resulting in an unsafe work environment. The trial court granted summary judgement to Norfolk Southern on the ground that the FRSA precluded FELA claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court's Decision
Writing for the Court, Justice Bethel wrote that FELA claims are not precluded by FERSA.
FELA provides railroad employees with a federal cause of action for injuries resulting for the negligence of a railroad. FRSA, by contrast, was enacted to promote railroad safety generally (i.e. not limited to employees) by granting the Secretary of Transportation power to make rules and regulations. Importantly, the FRSA has no private right of action, so the only persons with power to enforce its provisions are the Secretary of Transportation, the States, and the Attorney General.
In rejecting Norfolk Southern's preclusion argument, Justice Bethel noted that while the FRSA has an express preemption to prevent state law from interfering with national uniformity, it contains no provision to displace other federal laws operating in the same area. Further, while there is language in the statute speaking to the need for national uniformity in Railroad safety laws,this provision is found in the law's preemption provision. Without any textual indication of preclusion, it is conceivable that Congress could provide for overlapping causes of action. This is particularly true in light of the fact that FELA and the FLSA have coexisted for decades with no action to change their relationship.
The full opinion is available here.
Background
In June 2010 the gates at a public railway crossing were down for an extended period of time, such that cars approaching the crossing began to simply drive around them in the belief no trains were approaching. One such driver pulled around the gates, causing an accident which injured Harty, the train's driver (and Plaintiff in the case).
Proceedings Below
As relevant here, Hartry sued Norfolk Southern under FELA alleging it had failed to maintain the crossing gates, resulting in an unsafe work environment. The trial court granted summary judgement to Norfolk Southern on the ground that the FRSA precluded FELA claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court's Decision
Writing for the Court, Justice Bethel wrote that FELA claims are not precluded by FERSA.
FELA provides railroad employees with a federal cause of action for injuries resulting for the negligence of a railroad. FRSA, by contrast, was enacted to promote railroad safety generally (i.e. not limited to employees) by granting the Secretary of Transportation power to make rules and regulations. Importantly, the FRSA has no private right of action, so the only persons with power to enforce its provisions are the Secretary of Transportation, the States, and the Attorney General.
In rejecting Norfolk Southern's preclusion argument, Justice Bethel noted that while the FRSA has an express preemption to prevent state law from interfering with national uniformity, it contains no provision to displace other federal laws operating in the same area. Further, while there is language in the statute speaking to the need for national uniformity in Railroad safety laws,this provision is found in the law's preemption provision. Without any textual indication of preclusion, it is conceivable that Congress could provide for overlapping causes of action. This is particularly true in light of the fact that FELA and the FLSA have coexisted for decades with no action to change their relationship.
The full opinion is available here.
Life Sentences and Murder Convictions
S19G0472. WILKERSON v. THE STATE
S19A0992, S19A1006. NICHOLSON v. THE STATE (two cases)S19A0995. THE STATE v. RUMPH
S19A1017. BULLARD v. THE STATE
S19A1087. BALLIN v. THE STATE
S19A1215. MCGUIRE v. THE STATE
S19A1248. JONES v. THE STATE
S19A1280. CASH v. THE STATE
S19A1334. SPENCE v. THE STATE
S19A1342. REED v. THE STATE
S19A1344. CLARK v. THE STATE
S19A1396. DENSON v. THE STATE
S19A1504. RAMIREZ v. THE STATE
S19A1582. GEBHARDT v. THE STATE
S20A0100. DOZIER v. THE STATE
Attorney Discipline Cases
S19Z1567 IN THE MATTER OF SANDRA M. FULLER
S20Y0289 IN THE MATTER OF SARAH MALLAS WAYMAN
Sunday, December 22, 2019
Forthcoming Opinions
Opinions are expected tomorrow in the following cases:
S19G0007. COLLINS et al. v. ATHENS ORTHOPEDIC CLINIC, P.A.
S19G0008. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. HARTRY et al.
S19G0472. WILKERSON v. THE STATE
S19A0992, S19A1006. NICHOLSON v. THE STATE (two cases)
S19A0995. THE STATE v. RUMPH
S19A1017. BULLARD v. THE STATE
S19A1087. BALLIN v. THE STATE
S19A1215. MCGUIRE v. THE STATE
S19A1248. JONES v. THE STATE
S19A1280. CASH v. THE STATE
S19A1334. SPENCE v. THE STATE
S19A1342. REED v. THE STATE
S19G0007. COLLINS et al. v. ATHENS ORTHOPEDIC CLINIC, P.A.
S19G0008. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. HARTRY et al.
S19G0472. WILKERSON v. THE STATE
S19A0992, S19A1006. NICHOLSON v. THE STATE (two cases)
S19A0995. THE STATE v. RUMPH
S19A1017. BULLARD v. THE STATE
S19A1087. BALLIN v. THE STATE
S19A1215. MCGUIRE v. THE STATE
S19A1248. JONES v. THE STATE
S19A1280. CASH v. THE STATE
S19A1334. SPENCE v. THE STATE
S19A1342. REED v. THE STATE
S19A1344. CLARK v. THE STATE
S19A1396. DENSON v. THE STATE
S19A1504. RAMIREZ v. THE STATE
S19A1582. GEBHARDT v. THE STATE
S20A0100. DOZIER v. THE STATE
S19Y0831 IN THE MATTER OF SCOTT D. BENNETT
S19Z1567 IN THE MATTER OF SANDRA M. FULLER
S20Y0289 IN THE MATTER OF SARAH MALLAS WAYMAN
S19A1396. DENSON v. THE STATE
S19A1504. RAMIREZ v. THE STATE
S19A1582. GEBHARDT v. THE STATE
S20A0100. DOZIER v. THE STATE
S19Y0831 IN THE MATTER OF SCOTT D. BENNETT
S19Z1567 IN THE MATTER OF SANDRA M. FULLER
S20Y0289 IN THE MATTER OF SARAH MALLAS WAYMAN
Saturday, December 7, 2019
Justice Benham Announces Retirement
Bill Rankin of the Atlanta Journal Constitution reported today that Justice Benham will retire on March 1, 2020, changing plans to retire after finishing out his current term at the end of December, 2020.
The change is significant because it voids out the election for his seat that has been brewing since he originally announced his plan to retire. Announced contenders for the seat included Judge Sara Doyle of the Georgia Court of Appeals, former Congressman John Barrow, former State Representative Beth Beskin, and Alcovy County Superior Court Judge Horace Johnson.
By retiring before the end of his term, Justice Benham gives Governor Kemp the opportunity to appoint his successor, who will not have to run for re-election until 2022.
Rankin's article for the AJC is available here.
The change is significant because it voids out the election for his seat that has been brewing since he originally announced his plan to retire. Announced contenders for the seat included Judge Sara Doyle of the Georgia Court of Appeals, former Congressman John Barrow, former State Representative Beth Beskin, and Alcovy County Superior Court Judge Horace Johnson.
By retiring before the end of his term, Justice Benham gives Governor Kemp the opportunity to appoint his successor, who will not have to run for re-election until 2022.
Rankin's article for the AJC is available here.
Tuesday, November 19, 2019
Cert Petitions: November 18
Lalonde v. Taylor English Duma LLP et al
Lalonde is a malpractice action against the law firm of Taylor English Duma LLP. In essence, the claim alleged that one of the law firm's partners drafted a contract which permitted the majority owner of a company in which Lalonde owned a minority stake to unilaterally dissolve the company.
The trial court granted summary judgement to the defendants, holding that Lalonde could not show that the law firm was the proximate cause of his injuries based on his decision to settle the underlying lawsuit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on case law holding that the settlement of a viable claim severs the causal chain because it is impossible for the claim to terminate in the client's favor. Lalonde argued to the Court of Appeals that this case law was inapplicable because it involved settlement of lawsuits in which the alleged malpractice took place, and asserted the malpractice had caused the litigation in the first place.
The Court asked the parties to address the following question:
In a legal malpractice action, to what extent does the plaintiff's settlement of the underlying or related litigation sever the causal link between the plaintiff's damages and the defendant's alleged negligence?
The full Court of Appeals opinion is available here.
Denied
S19C0999. SHELNUTT et al. v. THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF SAVANNAH et al. (A18A1667)
S19C1009. FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. HILL et al. (A19A1055)
S19C1013. MCCRARY v. GEORGIA EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM (A18A2015)
S19C1015. TRUAX et al. v. CITIMORTGAGE, INC. (A18A2158)
S19C1028. AARON v. UNITED HEALTH SERVICES OF GEORGIA, INC. et al. (A18A1926)
S19C1030. PATEL v. SOUTHBRIDGE GOLF, LLC et al. (A18A1652)
S19C1043. MARTIN v. THE STATE (A18A1627)
S19C1050. BROUGHTON v. BROUGHTON et al. (A18A1776)
S19C1066. COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL BUILDING OWNERS ALLIANCE, INC. et al. v. VILLA SONOMA AT PERIMETER SUMMIT CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. (A18A1760)
S19C1067. ETTRICK et al. v. SUNTRUST MORTGAGE, INC. (A18A1615)
S19C1071. ROWLAND v. THE STATE (A18A1562)
S19C1072. LOVE v. THE STATE (A18A1818)
S19C1081. DREISBACH v. BASKIN & BASKIN, P.C. (A18A1455)
S19C1092. STONE v. HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF TIFT COUNTY (A18A2046)
S19C1100. WELLSTAR HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. et al. v. MOORE (A18A1810)
S19C1103. PHILLIPS v. THE STATE (A19A0045)
S19C1149. LEE v. THE STATE (A19A1402)
S19C1195. COBBLE v. FACHINI (A19D0367)
S19C1198. CASTLEBERRY v. REYNOLDS (A19D0397)
S20C0381. GEORGIA ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, P.C. et al. v. MOORE (A18A1810)
Lalonde is a malpractice action against the law firm of Taylor English Duma LLP. In essence, the claim alleged that one of the law firm's partners drafted a contract which permitted the majority owner of a company in which Lalonde owned a minority stake to unilaterally dissolve the company.
The trial court granted summary judgement to the defendants, holding that Lalonde could not show that the law firm was the proximate cause of his injuries based on his decision to settle the underlying lawsuit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on case law holding that the settlement of a viable claim severs the causal chain because it is impossible for the claim to terminate in the client's favor. Lalonde argued to the Court of Appeals that this case law was inapplicable because it involved settlement of lawsuits in which the alleged malpractice took place, and asserted the malpractice had caused the litigation in the first place.
The Court asked the parties to address the following question:
In a legal malpractice action, to what extent does the plaintiff's settlement of the underlying or related litigation sever the causal link between the plaintiff's damages and the defendant's alleged negligence?
The full Court of Appeals opinion is available here.
Denied
S19C0999. SHELNUTT et al. v. THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF SAVANNAH et al. (A18A1667)
S19C1009. FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. HILL et al. (A19A1055)
S19C1013. MCCRARY v. GEORGIA EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM (A18A2015)
S19C1015. TRUAX et al. v. CITIMORTGAGE, INC. (A18A2158)
S19C1028. AARON v. UNITED HEALTH SERVICES OF GEORGIA, INC. et al. (A18A1926)
S19C1030. PATEL v. SOUTHBRIDGE GOLF, LLC et al. (A18A1652)
S19C1043. MARTIN v. THE STATE (A18A1627)
S19C1050. BROUGHTON v. BROUGHTON et al. (A18A1776)
S19C1066. COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL BUILDING OWNERS ALLIANCE, INC. et al. v. VILLA SONOMA AT PERIMETER SUMMIT CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. (A18A1760)
S19C1067. ETTRICK et al. v. SUNTRUST MORTGAGE, INC. (A18A1615)
S19C1071. ROWLAND v. THE STATE (A18A1562)
S19C1072. LOVE v. THE STATE (A18A1818)
S19C1081. DREISBACH v. BASKIN & BASKIN, P.C. (A18A1455)
S19C1092. STONE v. HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF TIFT COUNTY (A18A2046)
S19C1100. WELLSTAR HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. et al. v. MOORE (A18A1810)
S19C1103. PHILLIPS v. THE STATE (A19A0045)
S19C1149. LEE v. THE STATE (A19A1402)
S19C1195. COBBLE v. FACHINI (A19D0367)
S19C1198. CASTLEBERRY v. REYNOLDS (A19D0397)
S20C0381. GEORGIA ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, P.C. et al. v. MOORE (A18A1810)
Monday, November 18, 2019
Notable Opinions: November 18
Murder Convictions
S19A1146. HOLMES v. THE STATE
S19A1201. MORRALL v. THE STATE
S19A1226. JORDAN v. THE STATE
S19A1586. CARTER v. THE STATE
Attorney Discipline Cases
S19Y1471. IN THE MATTER OF CARLA BURTON GAINES
S20Y0335. IN THE MATTER OF NATASHA SIMONE WHITE
S19A1146. HOLMES v. THE STATE
S19A1201. MORRALL v. THE STATE
S19A1226. JORDAN v. THE STATE
S19A1586. CARTER v. THE STATE
Attorney Discipline Cases
S19Y1471. IN THE MATTER OF CARLA BURTON GAINES
S20Y0335. IN THE MATTER OF NATASHA SIMONE WHITE
Tuesday, November 5, 2019
Cert Petitions: November 4
The Court granted certiorari in three new cases today: the first deals with mutual exclusivity in criminal convictions; the second with fraudulent misrepresentation; and the third with in rem forfeiture proceedings.
Middleton v. The State
Middleton stems from the Defendant's conviction of a litany of crimes for the armed robbery of a woman in Savannah, Georgia. Relevant here, Middleton argued to the Court of Appeals that his convictions for armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, and theft by receiving stolen property were mutually exclusive - because all three convictions related to the same vehicle.
The Court of Appeals declined to analyze the mutual exclusivity of the hijacking claim, pointing out that trial counsel for Middleton had not raised the issue at the time the verdict was rendered.
As to the robbery and theft by receiving counts, the Court of Appeals found the convictions were not mutually exclusive. Verdicts are mutually exclusive where "a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other." Shepherd v. State, 280 Ga. 245, 248 (2006). Here, however, the armed robbery count alleged the taking of the victim's keys and person, whereas the theft by receiving stolen property count dealt with "retain[ing] the victim's vehicle after hijacking the vehicle."
The grant of certiorari appears to deal with the hijacking and the theft counts (to which the Court of Appeals found Middleton had waived his objection).
The Court asked the parties to address two questions:
(1) Must a defendant object to the form of the verdict in order to assert on appeal that convictions are mutually exclusive?
(2) Are convictions for hijacking and theft by receiving the same vehicle mutually exclusive?
The full Court of Appeals opinion is available here.
Global Payments, Inc. v. Incomm Financial Services, Inc.
The case involves a fraudulent misrepresentation claim regarding the servicing of prepaid VISA cards. Incomm Financial Services ("IFS") issued and serviced the cards, and Global Payments Inc ("Global") sold products granting merchants access to the VISA network.
The basics of a transaction are familiar: a consumer uses the card to make a purchase from a merchant, which transmits transaction data to companies like Global. Global then either submits the transaction to VISA or declines it - usually because the transaction was irregular, unverifiable, invalid, or otherwise contained fraudulent data. If Global detected a basis for rejecting the transaction, it had a duty not to transmit the data to VISA.
The complaint in the case alleged fraudulent misrepresentation based on Global's transmission of invalid transactions. IFS alleged that Global had failed to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in forwarding these transactions onto them.
The Court asked the parties to address the following question:
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court's order dismissing the respondent's negligent misrepresentation claim against the petitioner for allegedly transmitting false information made by a third-party?
The Court of Appeals opinion is available here.
Crowder v. State of Georgia
Crowder involves an in rem forfeiture action for more than $46,000 seized from a passenger attempting to board a flight at Hartsfield-Jackson Airport.
The Superior Court awarded the money to Crowder, but the Court of Appeals held that (1) Crowder's answer did not comply with pleading requirements for forfeiture actions, and (2) the state sufficiently effected service of process.
The Court asked the parties to address two questions:
(1) In an in rem forfeiture proceeding, may the forfeiture complaint be served by publication in the first instance when an interest holder resides out of state?
(2) Must a trial court rule on a pending motion for more definite statement before striking a claimant's answer as insufficient?
The full Court of Appeals opinion is available here.
Denied
S19C0701. CARCAMO v. THE STATE (A19A0529)
S19C0904. BADDELEY v. THE STATE (A18A1623)
S19C0910. KNOUS v. GEORGIAN FINE PROPERTIES, LLC et al. (A18A1559)
S19C0914. GANDHI v. PATEL et al. (A18A1472, A18A1473)
S19C0919. BOLTON et al. v. GOLDEN BUSINESS, INC. (A18A1600)
S19C0921. PIERSON v. THE STATE (A18A1460)
S19C0923. WATSON v. CROWE (A18A1984)
S19C0925. JOHNSON v. THE STATE (A18A2016)
S19C0926. DEMARTINO v. THE STATE (A17A1249)
S19C0929. PATEL et al. v. GANDHI (A18A1472)
S19C0930. BURNETTE v. BARRETT et al. (A18A1705)
S19C0932. IN THE INTEREST OF S.H. et al., CHILDREN (A18A1506)
S19C0938. RIDLEY v. GEORGIA LOTTERY CORPORATION (A19A0795)
S19C0943. SUNDY v. FRIENDSHIP PAVILION ACQUISITION COMPANY, LLC (A19D0345)
S19C0944. HICKMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS OF GEORGIA (A19A1337)
S19C0945. JOHNSON v. THE STATE (A19A1329)
S19C0955. SAGE et al. v. METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY (A18A1514)
S19C0961. FORD v. FORD (A18A1688)
S19C0962. IN THE INTEREST OF P.H.P., A CHILD (A18A1666)
S19C0963. WHITE-LETT v. LINEBARGER, GOGGAN, BLAIR & SAMPSON, LLP et al. (A18A1557)
S19C0966. ATLANTA HAWKS BASKETBALL & ENTERTAINMENT, LLC v. NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY (A18A1953)
S19C0968. WATERS v. THE STATE (A18A2031)
S19C0973. FITZPATRICK v. THE STATE (A18A1762)
S19C0976. WARNOCK v. SANFORD et al. (A18A1656)
S19C0978. DEEDS v. THE STATE (A18A1644)
S19C0979. HARTMAN v. PIP-GROUP, LLC (A18A1529)
S19C0984. BURGESS v. THE STATE (A18A1596)
S19C0989. COY v. THE STATE (A18A1955)
S19C0994. JHJ JODECO 65, LLC et al. v. EMSON INVESTMENT PROPERTIES, LLC (A18A1598)
S19C0997. SIMMONS et al. v. UNIVERSAL PROTECTION SERVICES, LLC et al. (A18A1702)
S19C1002. BARUTI et al. v. ONA et al. (A18A1718)
S19C1003. BYRD v. THE STATE (A18A1589, A18A1593)
S19C1010. COHAN LAW GROUP, LLC et al. v. KATZ (A18A1775)
S19C1011. CMV, LLC v. ENOCKOMAN, LLC (A18A1881)
S19C1014. WARREN AVERETT, LLC v. LANDCASTLE ACQUISITION CORP. (A18A2117)
S19C1016. WARD v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (A19A1555)
S19C1018. GEORGIA LOTTERY CORPORATION v. PATEL (A18A2143)
S19C1020. DUKE v. THE STATE (A19A1461)
S19C1037. BELL v. THE STATE (A18A1478)
S19C1049. AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 732 v. METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY (A18A1680)
S19C1059. YANCEY v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION a/k/a FANNIE MAE (A19A1142)
S19C1069. GUTTER-PARKER v. KING (A18A1511)
S19C1074. HALL et al. v. DAVIS LAWN CARE SERVICE, INC. et al. (A19A1049)
S19C1084. THE STATE v. EVANS (A18A1895)
S19C1094. PANTERA ENTERPRISES, INC. v. BLAIR (A18A2108)
S19C1393. JCG FARMS OF ALABAMA, LLC v. HOBERT et al. (A19A0099)
S20C0243. IN THE INTEREST OF S.H. et al., CHILDREN (A18A1507)
Middleton v. The State
Middleton stems from the Defendant's conviction of a litany of crimes for the armed robbery of a woman in Savannah, Georgia. Relevant here, Middleton argued to the Court of Appeals that his convictions for armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, and theft by receiving stolen property were mutually exclusive - because all three convictions related to the same vehicle.
The Court of Appeals declined to analyze the mutual exclusivity of the hijacking claim, pointing out that trial counsel for Middleton had not raised the issue at the time the verdict was rendered.
As to the robbery and theft by receiving counts, the Court of Appeals found the convictions were not mutually exclusive. Verdicts are mutually exclusive where "a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other." Shepherd v. State, 280 Ga. 245, 248 (2006). Here, however, the armed robbery count alleged the taking of the victim's keys and person, whereas the theft by receiving stolen property count dealt with "retain[ing] the victim's vehicle after hijacking the vehicle."
The grant of certiorari appears to deal with the hijacking and the theft counts (to which the Court of Appeals found Middleton had waived his objection).
The Court asked the parties to address two questions:
(1) Must a defendant object to the form of the verdict in order to assert on appeal that convictions are mutually exclusive?
(2) Are convictions for hijacking and theft by receiving the same vehicle mutually exclusive?
The full Court of Appeals opinion is available here.
Global Payments, Inc. v. Incomm Financial Services, Inc.
The case involves a fraudulent misrepresentation claim regarding the servicing of prepaid VISA cards. Incomm Financial Services ("IFS") issued and serviced the cards, and Global Payments Inc ("Global") sold products granting merchants access to the VISA network.
The basics of a transaction are familiar: a consumer uses the card to make a purchase from a merchant, which transmits transaction data to companies like Global. Global then either submits the transaction to VISA or declines it - usually because the transaction was irregular, unverifiable, invalid, or otherwise contained fraudulent data. If Global detected a basis for rejecting the transaction, it had a duty not to transmit the data to VISA.
The complaint in the case alleged fraudulent misrepresentation based on Global's transmission of invalid transactions. IFS alleged that Global had failed to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in forwarding these transactions onto them.
The Court asked the parties to address the following question:
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court's order dismissing the respondent's negligent misrepresentation claim against the petitioner for allegedly transmitting false information made by a third-party?
The Court of Appeals opinion is available here.
Crowder v. State of Georgia
Crowder involves an in rem forfeiture action for more than $46,000 seized from a passenger attempting to board a flight at Hartsfield-Jackson Airport.
The Superior Court awarded the money to Crowder, but the Court of Appeals held that (1) Crowder's answer did not comply with pleading requirements for forfeiture actions, and (2) the state sufficiently effected service of process.
The Court asked the parties to address two questions:
(1) In an in rem forfeiture proceeding, may the forfeiture complaint be served by publication in the first instance when an interest holder resides out of state?
(2) Must a trial court rule on a pending motion for more definite statement before striking a claimant's answer as insufficient?
The full Court of Appeals opinion is available here.
Denied
S19C0701. CARCAMO v. THE STATE (A19A0529)
S19C0904. BADDELEY v. THE STATE (A18A1623)
S19C0910. KNOUS v. GEORGIAN FINE PROPERTIES, LLC et al. (A18A1559)
S19C0914. GANDHI v. PATEL et al. (A18A1472, A18A1473)
S19C0919. BOLTON et al. v. GOLDEN BUSINESS, INC. (A18A1600)
S19C0921. PIERSON v. THE STATE (A18A1460)
S19C0923. WATSON v. CROWE (A18A1984)
S19C0925. JOHNSON v. THE STATE (A18A2016)
S19C0926. DEMARTINO v. THE STATE (A17A1249)
S19C0929. PATEL et al. v. GANDHI (A18A1472)
S19C0930. BURNETTE v. BARRETT et al. (A18A1705)
S19C0932. IN THE INTEREST OF S.H. et al., CHILDREN (A18A1506)
S19C0938. RIDLEY v. GEORGIA LOTTERY CORPORATION (A19A0795)
S19C0943. SUNDY v. FRIENDSHIP PAVILION ACQUISITION COMPANY, LLC (A19D0345)
S19C0944. HICKMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS OF GEORGIA (A19A1337)
S19C0945. JOHNSON v. THE STATE (A19A1329)
S19C0955. SAGE et al. v. METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY (A18A1514)
S19C0961. FORD v. FORD (A18A1688)
S19C0962. IN THE INTEREST OF P.H.P., A CHILD (A18A1666)
S19C0963. WHITE-LETT v. LINEBARGER, GOGGAN, BLAIR & SAMPSON, LLP et al. (A18A1557)
S19C0966. ATLANTA HAWKS BASKETBALL & ENTERTAINMENT, LLC v. NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY (A18A1953)
S19C0968. WATERS v. THE STATE (A18A2031)
S19C0973. FITZPATRICK v. THE STATE (A18A1762)
S19C0976. WARNOCK v. SANFORD et al. (A18A1656)
S19C0978. DEEDS v. THE STATE (A18A1644)
S19C0979. HARTMAN v. PIP-GROUP, LLC (A18A1529)
S19C0984. BURGESS v. THE STATE (A18A1596)
S19C0989. COY v. THE STATE (A18A1955)
S19C0994. JHJ JODECO 65, LLC et al. v. EMSON INVESTMENT PROPERTIES, LLC (A18A1598)
S19C0997. SIMMONS et al. v. UNIVERSAL PROTECTION SERVICES, LLC et al. (A18A1702)
S19C1002. BARUTI et al. v. ONA et al. (A18A1718)
S19C1003. BYRD v. THE STATE (A18A1589, A18A1593)
S19C1010. COHAN LAW GROUP, LLC et al. v. KATZ (A18A1775)
S19C1011. CMV, LLC v. ENOCKOMAN, LLC (A18A1881)
S19C1014. WARREN AVERETT, LLC v. LANDCASTLE ACQUISITION CORP. (A18A2117)
S19C1016. WARD v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (A19A1555)
S19C1018. GEORGIA LOTTERY CORPORATION v. PATEL (A18A2143)
S19C1020. DUKE v. THE STATE (A19A1461)
S19C1037. BELL v. THE STATE (A18A1478)
S19C1049. AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 732 v. METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY (A18A1680)
S19C1059. YANCEY v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION a/k/a FANNIE MAE (A19A1142)
S19C1069. GUTTER-PARKER v. KING (A18A1511)
S19C1074. HALL et al. v. DAVIS LAWN CARE SERVICE, INC. et al. (A19A1049)
S19C1084. THE STATE v. EVANS (A18A1895)
S19C1094. PANTERA ENTERPRISES, INC. v. BLAIR (A18A2108)
S19C1393. JCG FARMS OF ALABAMA, LLC v. HOBERT et al. (A19A0099)
S20C0243. IN THE INTEREST OF S.H. et al., CHILDREN (A18A1507)
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